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I IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVID LOYOLA 
Defendant. 
I * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
The Affiant, being first duly sworn deposes and states as follows: 
1. That my name is Allene Kerwood and that I am an adult 
resident of Tooele County, State of Utah. 
2. That I am employed as a Trooper for the Utah Highway; 
Patrol. 
3. That I have been employed as a dispatcher. 
4. That I have personal knowledge that when a citizen calls 
A F F I D A V I T 
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'Af f idavit 
dispatch to report an incident the citizen is requested to provide 
his or her name and address. 
5. That on August 31, 1989, I was advised by dispatch 
that a citizen had called from the pro-shop at Stansbury and had 
reported that an intoxicated person was driving a blue Mazda pickup 
Iwith two barrels in back. 
6. That I located and stopped the described vehicle and found 
the driver to be David Loyola. 
7. That I noticed an odor of alcohol about Mr. Loyola and 
that he was having difficulty with his speech. Accordingly I 
conducted a DUI investigation resulting in the arrest of Mr. Loyola. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
ALLENE KERWOOD ^ 
Utah Highway Patrol 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
(COUNTY OF TOOELE ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s && day of fhhl 
isff , by -Ftllene Ketmapd 
(IMW m± 
NOTARY KUBLIC 
ResidingMn Tooele County, Utah 
My Commi ss ion Expi res : /0-*f~f/ 
&Z/k.A. &AJ->- ^O^O 
INTOXILIZER 
OPERATIONAL CHECKLIST -C (ASA) 
Ch\/l* AoyoC^ DATE 0 / / ^ TIME 
T NO. 9C/~OQ/dt/Y^LOCATION 7 g c 5 0 
(\ 1. POWER SWITCH ON, READY LIGHT ON. 
( \ 2. CONNECT BREATH TUBE TO PUMP TUBE, INSERT TEST RECORD CARD. 
( N 3. PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 2. 
4. PRESS ADVANCE, WAIT FOR LIGHT 3. 
( » 5. DISCONNECT PUMP TUBE FROM BREATH TUBE, EXTEND BREATH TUBE AND INSERT 
MOUTHPIECE, TAKE BREATH SAMPLE. (NOTE TIME) LIGHT 4 WILL COME ON AFTER 
SAMPLE IS TAKEN. O / g C> , f *~/ / 
\ ) 6. REMOVE MOUTHPIECE, HOUSE BREATHTUBE AND CONNECT TO PUMP TUBE, PRESS 
ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 5. 
% 0 7. PRESS ADVANCE, INSERT QUARTZ CALIBRATOR WAIT FOR LIGHT 6 THEN REMOVE 
QUARTZ CALIBRATOR. 
"N 8. PRESS ADVANCE WAIT FOR LIGHT 7. REMOVE TEST RECORD CARD. 
9. POWER SWITCH OFF. 
BW-6300/224 PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT / 
:_J=ApMl 
>0*l 
-/o<4' 
TEST RECORD CARD FOR THE 
INTOXILYZER® INSTRUMENT-4011 MODr' 
GRAMS ALCOHOL PER 
2'0 UTRES 8REATH 
• 
• 
• 
• 
A 0 0 
• 
C 3 5 
• 
A 0 0 
• 
B 1 4 
• 
A 0 0 
• 
INSTRUMENT PRINT CODE 
A — AIR BLANK 
B — BREATH 
C — CALIBRATOR (Simulator) 
OBSERVED SUBJECT 
FOR REQUIRED OBSERVATION 
PERIOD AND FOLLOWED 
CHECK LIST 
OPERATOR'S INITIAL 
rrxo 
INSTRUMENT LOCATION 
9</-<x>ro<{$ 
INSTRUMENT SERIAL NUMBER 
OAT& ' ' 
fo'^JkM&i (&— 
TIME FIRST OBSERVED TIME TESTSTA-RTED i 
•^ * OPERATOR l / 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND/OR REMARKS 
-/OJ\ 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER. GOVERNOR JOHN T. NIELSEN. COMMISSIONER 
0. DOUGLAS BOORERO, OEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
L OALE ELTON. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTA\ENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, being first duly swor 
1. I am the Breathtesting Supervisor 
and the official keeper of and res 
maintenance check records of the b 
maintained in the State of Utah. 
2. Attached are true and correct copi 
maintenance and certification for 
numoer Q^QOj/pJz£%_ located at 
of which the originals are kept on 
of official business, for the Stat 
Public Safety and in accordance wi 
of the Commissioner of Public Safe 
3. The attached tests were done befpr 
n, s tate that: 
of the Utah Highway Patrol 
ponsible for the 
reathtesting instruments 
es of the records of 
the Intoxilyzer serial 
-C^^J^^^i > -
file by me, in the course 
e of* Utah, Department of 
th the current regulations 
ty. 
e and after the date of 
Zi—Mf&2r_ is_?v . 
The breathtest technicians(s) whose signature(s) appear on 
the attached affidavits are certified by the State of Utah 
and have met one or more of the following requirements as 
required by the Department of Public Safety: 
a. have successfully completed the Breathtesting 
Supervisors Course at Indiana University, or: 
b. a manufacturer's repair technician course for 
breathtesting instruments in use in the State of Utah, or 
c. is qualified by nature of his employment or training to 
maintain and repair the breathtesting instrument in 
question and to instruct in the proper operation of t£e 
instrument. 
S.ddUNIVld 
) 
PERSONALLY APR 
~£~9??^i?3'+*'' I STATE OF UT^g^ ^ 
COUNTY OF___Z^6]T^£^_) 
ON THE_^ 5TLDAY OF<22^„„19J^f 
ME, DON W. MARCEK, WHO BEING DULY SWORN BEF 
•"•^ THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I CE 
IS AN OFFICER AND EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTM 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSj 
INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMEN 
SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE. 
NOTARY, WJBLIC: J^^? 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES &>///$/ RESIDING 
"PROlfP Of OUR ?E<mT, SERVICE WITH PRIPE" 
UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 
Mike Chabnes. Superintendent 
Sgt. Don W. Marcek 
Breathtesting Supervisor 
Utah Highway Patrol 
BEFORE 
ED 
PERSON 
TY 
4501 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 965-4518 
UTAH_DEPT^_OF_PUBLIC_SAFE (A) 
I/We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial riumber^Qj^jOQJJ^jQ 
located at_Jl/jQOJiiJ$L was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on Jj__Q^<c 19_?J^_at_£2££<2i£_M. 
2. This was done by a currently certified rechinician and according 
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety-
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which 
were made at the time these tests were done. 
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
( ^-^Electrical power check: 
(Power switch on power indicator light is on) 
( U f Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
;( ^ "^Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds 
( U f Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly). 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on)... 
absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within'+/- -01 of calibration setting).. 
( UO Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
svithin +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest).. 
( Ixj Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath 
REPAIRS REQUIRED(Explain). 
..o. L & Z A ^ . 
simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded 
( L^o The results of this test show that the instrument 
is working properly 
YES NO 
) 
) 
1ST 
) 
) 
L a s t p r i o r c h e c k o f t h i s i n s t r u m e n t was done on 
CERTIFIED BREjSjI ^EST TECHNICIAN(S) 
STATE OF UTAH . ) 
COUNTY OV.itfQPjp. ) I / W e , on o a t h , s t a t e t k a t t h e urego: 
My .c 
rx r u D . n c // / , uounty o i ttesi 
ommiss ion . e x p i r e s y J^/9/* __^ 1 9 ^ / . . . . 
and s w o r n b e f o r e me t h i s J+_ day o f (JttLuZ£&L 19jjffi 
'^L^J^^/^ C i t y of H e s i d e n c e . ^ ^ ^ ^ 
i c : _// / ,County of R e s i d e n c e ~fflQp/€_. 
UTAH_DEPTi_0F_PyBLIC_SAFETY_RECORD_OF_INTOXILYZER_TEST_A (A) 
I/We the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that: 
1. Breath testing instrument, INTOXILYZER, serial number^£~£fc3/g?ff£I 
located a t ^ ^ ^ ^ _ ^ L - _ ^ £ ^ was properly checked by me/us in 
the course of official duties, on ^_5$?7£&4&g._. 1 9 ^ S a t f ^ ^ M . 
2. This was done by a currently certified techinician and according 
to the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. 
3. This is the official record and notes of this procedure which 
were made at the time these tests were done. 
THE EOi,] 
*0 El< ( 
on) 
( 
LOWING TESTS WERE MADE: 
ectrical power check: 
ower switch on power indicator light is 
Temperature check (Ready light is on) 
Internal purge check: 
(Air pump works, runs for approximately 35 seconds. 
Zero set, Error indicator, and Printer Check: 
(Zero set at .000, .001, .002, .003.) 
(With proper zero set, printer works properly).. 
(Printer deactivated when error light is on).... 
absorption calibrator test (if equipped) 
(Reads within +/- .01 of calibration setting)... 
( *—5"Checked with known sample: (Simulator, 3 tests 
within +/- .005 or 5% whichever is the greatest)... 
( °)uives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters . 
of breath 
REPAIRS R E Q U I R E D ( E x p l a i n ) _ ^ ^ ^ £ l ^ ^ ^ > ^ ^ 
-€^ & 
( ^ The simulator solution was of the correct kind and 
properly compounded 
( £—)--The results of this test show that the instrument 
is working properly , 
YES 
^\ 
NO 
^ 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Last prior check of this instrument was done on X_-^£^£-£ZI 19^*2-
CERTIFIEDB_REATH TEST TECHNICIANS 
STATE OF UTAH , ) 
COUNTY O F S l & l Z l t — J 
&&. 
^?ubsornihe.d'--and sworn b e f o r e me t h i s _2_ day of __v 
r o t a r y P u b l i c 
^/My^-oommiss ion e x p i r e s _ _ 
i d e n c e ^S/4 Ci ty of Res: 
yCounty of R e s i d e n c e 
jjJOHN K. WEST 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
^ooele County Courthouse 
&7 South Main Street, Tooele, Utah 84074 
Telephone: 882-5550, Ex. 351 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DAVID LOYOLA 
Defendant . 
A F F I D A V I T 
Criminal No.895000033 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
) 
s s . 
STATE OF UTAH 
POUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, being first duly sworn deposes and states as 
fo1 lows: 
1. That my name is Henry M. White. 
2. That I am an adult resident of Salt Lake County. 
3. That during August of 1988 I was employed at the pro-shop 
in Stansbury Park in Tooele County. 
4. That on October 31, 1988, I observed a man later 
identified to me as David Loyola. 
5. That Mr. Loyola had several drinks in my presence and was 
^age Two 
THE STATE OF UTAH vs DAVID LOYOLA 
Af f idavi t 
visibly staggering. 
6. In my opinion Mr. Loyola was drunk. 
7. I mentioned to Mr. Loyola that he should find a ride home 
iwi th someone. 
8. Mr. Loyola got in his truck to leave 
9. I called the Sheriff's Office gave my name and address 
and reported that an intoxicated person was leaving the pro-shop and 
Jl described the truck Mr. Loyola was driving, 
Further affiant sayeth not. / 
HEN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
iCOUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this /- day of 
19 (h by „ i - i ^ 
NOTARY PUB LI 
'Res i d i n g i n 
U t a h 
My Commi § 
^ ComroU«k>n ExpUt O 
March 1,1992 
PATRICK H. DUNLAVY 
SONortfcUdft 
(J> Too***, 
>% UT S4074 . ^ 
1 me to proceed without him because of— 
2 THE COURT: In the trial? 
3 MR. VALDEZ: In the trial. And in order t o — 
4 THE COURT: We'll do that. 
5 MR. VALDEZ: In order to— 
6 THE COURT: Unless the motion disposes of the case. 
7 MR. VALDEZ: The motion is a motion to suppress and 
8 it's our contention, we have submitted memorandum to that 
9 effect— 
10 THE COURT: And I have reviewed them. 
11 MR. VALDEZ: —that there was no probable cause to 
12 stop and that that was not sufficient cause under Utah State law. 
13 We both submitted memorandum and the State argues, I think, that 
14 the State ought to adopt the Ethenbauch case or the Alaska 
15 standards for those type of stops. 
16 THE COURT: Well, let me set the record for this, then. 
17 We are now going to proceed on the motion in limine to suppress. 
18 MR. VALDEZ: But let me--let me indicate— 
19 THE COURT: Without the presence of the defendant and 
20 you1re waiving his right to be here. 
21 MR. VALDEZ: That!s right. Let— 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Are you ready to proceed on the 
23 mot ion? 
24 MR. WEST: Y e s , your Honor. We've d i s c u s s e d t h i s 
25 p r e v i o u s l y , and I t h i n k t h a t w e ' v e a g r e e d t o do s t i p u l a t i o n as t o 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 4 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
what the proffered evidence would be both for the motion and the 
trial. 
THE COURT: Okay, I v/ant you to proffer the evidence 
then so that I can accept that. 
MR. WEST: State has submitted a couple of affidavits. 
Those affidavits indicate what those individuals would testify to. 
The only thing I would add is that in further testimony, I think 
Officer Kirklund would testify that she never observed any 
driving pattern. And. in addition to thp+" I think the State will 
also proffer evidence concerning field sobriety tests and the 
r e s ii ] t s o £ a n :i i 11 o x :i ] \ z e i: t e s t , a n d w i 11 i t h a t I t h i n} :  a ] ] w e need 
to do is argue the motion. 
THE COURT: Well, have your proffer of proof then. 
M a k e a statenieni :. I :I : i I ' t ; ia i I t t: .o just accept: the a f f :i davi ts .  
MR. WEST: Okay. 
THE COURT: So make your proffer of proof. 
MR. W E S T • I i 1 :i :i i I }< : in a y b e ., i t in i •• :x h t b e i n t h e :i n t e r e s t o f 
time for me to just go ahead and proffer everything for purposes 
of both the motion and the trial, if I could do that. 
MR. VA I ,DEZ : Tl l i i I , on ] d be — 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WEST: If Henry White were called to testify, the 
S t a t e w o ii ] < :i p r o f f e i: 11 i a * * " 
was employed at the Pro Shop at Stansbur y Park jt -.,i ..Cvie 
County on August the 31st of 1988. That on that day, he observed 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
2 5 
•.iie d e f e n d a n t , Mr. L o y o l a , a t t h e P r o S h o p . T h a t h e o b s e r v e d 
Mr . L o y o l a c o n s i ira e s o me a ] c o ho J , a i , d t h : „, t: i i I 11 i s p i n \ " > n , 
:•:::. Loyola was drunk. 
Henry White would testify—further testify that he 
obs e r v e d — 
THE COURT: Did you say where the Pro Shop was? 
MR. WEST: It's at Stansbury Park. 
T H E C 0 U R T : Ok a y I 11: I :si i ] ; I : 1 16 • i: e c o i : • 1 o u g i 11 t o show 
where that is. 
MR. WEST 
r
~--
:
~
7
 ^  "" ^  " uun Ly t 
MR. WEST \ Tooele County. 
Further, Mr. White observed the defendant, Mr. Loyola, 
; . . . «-M . . - :_te would testify that he 
called -.he sheriff's office and reported an intoxicated driver, 
indicating the location and a description of the vehicle, a nd 
i hat he ga/v e 1 IJ s name and address to the dispatcher. 
. I would proffer that if called to testify, Trooper 
Helene KerwTood would testify that she's d. trooper fc ^ r%w T 
ir'd tio.1 , that she has previous _/ oeen empl oyed as a d^spator^r ^n, 
that she has personal knowledge that whe -; d i z e n ca is : *: T.O 
report an incident, he is recuested ^o r—-vide .- r. ~::v.r A fares' 
She wc uld testi fy t:iat. o;
 kJtu-u.. ^  ^ o
1
 *z -t ,;u_ -as 
advised by dispatch that a citizen had called from, the Pro Shop 
at Stansbury Park in Tooele County and reported an intoxicated 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
person driving a blue iMazda pickup with two barrels in the back. 
That she stopped the vehicle as it was leaving the Stansbury Park 
a r e a t h a t s h e :i d e n 1: :i f i e d t h e d r i v e i: a s I h e d e f e n d a n t 1 11:, I i o y o 1 a . 
That she noticed an odor of alcohol about him and some speech 
problems. That she requested that he perform field sobriety tests 
a n d those t e s t s :i r I c 11 i d e d t h e h o r i z o n t a 1 g a z e N y s t a gm i i s , t h e heel 
to toe test, the one leg lift and based upon her training and 
experience and her observations of the defendant and his perfor-
mance o £ t h e f i e J d s o b r i e t y t e s t s s h e f c: rm e d t h e o p i n :i o n t h a t h e 
was too intoxicated to safely drive .and placed him-~ 
THE COURT: Can you, for this purpose now, because 
y o ii' r e d o i i i g 11 i i s f o i: t r i a ] , s t a t e h e r f :i n d i n g s D n t h o s e t e s t s'? 
As a matter of. proffer. It's sort of conclusionary to say in her 
opinion observing those. Can you say what--
MR . WE S T : I :: a i i r a f e i: t c 1 i e r r • a p o r t, y c • i i r H o i I o r 
THE COURT: Okay. 
.MR. WEST:. I can state what s h e — 
THE COURT: I !: :1 link for the record, I /' u L I I i kv i ) 
have that. 
MR. WEST: Okay, With regard to the horizontal gaze 
Nystagmus test, her testimony woi iJ d i: e 11 ia.t s 1 ie coi 11 d i io t 
discern Nystagmus, the subject would not comply with the 
directions, ~nd *-rc\:ld not follow the pen -would follow the pen 
w.i th his wh-...;.., :\..,;.. ,::.<! n ot inst w i t h ±. e y e s . 
With regard to the heel to toe test, she would testify 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
1
 that his balance was unsteady, he could not walk heel to toe. 
2 Approximate,] y — 
3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Two inches. 
4 MR. WEST: Pardon me? 
5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER i Two i riches . 
6 MR. WEST: Okay. Approximately two inches between, or 
7 would cross his lead foot over the other foot to keep balance. 
8 T h a t h e c o i i n t e d n :i n e s t e p s f o r w a r d , b i 11 c • i I 1 v e i • :j h t s t e p s b a • n k . 
9 With regard.- to the leg lift, that he could only lift 
10 his leg approximately three inches, could only hold for the 
11 COL., . ..-.:...- ,.- ..<L . ^ .--• . :ting 1:1 le f Dot dowi J , Was 
12 unsteady in couming, and counted one thousand four anduthen I'm 
13 off the p a c e , <-\ne t h o u s a n d ? 
14 *\ _ :-... " . :-r v;;'::\: .- ; one thousand five (ii laudible] 
15 MR. WEST: Okay. Counted one thousand four, one 
16 thousand five, one thousand ten, one thousand eight, one thousand 
17 thirty and stopped the test at that point. 
18 And as I mentioned earlier, the proffer would be that 
19 based upon her training and experience she, and her observations 
20 of the defendant, she formed the opinion that he was unable to 
21 safely drive, and placed him under arrest at that time. 
22 That she requested the defendant to submit to an 
23 intoxilyzer test and he agreed to dc > that. That the BaJ<; ,er i i lie 
24 was observed for — she checked his mouth and observed him for 15 
25 minutes before the test was given, and he was not allowed to have 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
8 
anything in his mouth during that period of time. 
She would testify that she's certified in the operation 
3
 j of the intoxilyzer machine and that the machine was functioning 
4
 I propei"]// w h e n H I M r "-• t w a s a d m i n i s t e r e d . T h a t the test w a s g i v e n 
5
 45—approximately 45 minutes from the time that the defendant was 
6 stopped, and so we're within the two-hour presumption. 
7
 J I - *• * "' " -; has the printout, the 
results of the test, because this was brought up from the Justice 
9
 I of the Peace Court, and we didn't receive that information back; 
10 | Y\ o w e v e r , I d o 1 I a 1:; > e :i i i i i i ;v f :i 1 e t h e c e r t i f :i e d - - o r t: h e a f f i d a ^  r j t s f o r 
11
 I the intoxilyzer machine. 
12 Arid, we would offer the affidavit. Does the Court have 
13
 the test resul ts ~ ckli st? 
14 THE COUR1 C-J:I ' t know I'll have to check and see. 
15 MR,'WEST: I have an original of the test result, 1 
16 o n l y h a v e a p h o t o c o p y ,\ "\ui -•htM-k] i i j jy ' i I , / r m Uortnr. 
17 I i was under the understanding that all of that™--that evidence is 
18 a ] ready in the Court's file. 
19 THE COURT : N< ) t her e . 
20 MR. WEST: Then, your Honor, I have the—one of the 
2' . oi the printout and I have a photocopy, whicl i, i f 
^ Cai>:« * '• t e s t i f y , w e w- -. : : •* t .1 ire ugh testimoi iy : •. f: 
23 Officer Kerwood, who v<-• id also maicate that the copy :i s a true 
2 4 £ • • ' heck list that she used and that it was 
25 ' :- \e p cocei chcc;v. _ J *- : ^.acn-ne tl lat was i lsed , ai i :l tl ic , I the ,/t 
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in fact is the printout. 
MR. VALDEZ: She has the original of the checklist. 
MR. WES".: , : f:n sorry. I thought that was left with 
the Court. My m i stake . Off I cer Xerwooc I 1: las i J .e :)ri gi nal of the 
checklist here, and I would offer the checklist and the printout, 
as Exhibits 1 and 2. 
THE COURT: Does part I H ''""'',!f proffer and stipulation as 
to the proffer include that Exhibit, I assume we ought to mark 
this Exhibit ^~ , vr — ' ; the affidavit for checkina of ";-? 
10
 , - •* - -- - . - .'re:.- ^ ; _ j s ,ne fact 
that this may be received, under the rules of evidence, Murray vs 
Hall, that it meets ai 1 of the requirements. 
MR. VALDEZ : I tl lii lk so , J udge . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. VALDEZ: It was in close proximity to th< 2 t:i me of t 
actual test, 
THE COURT: I t looks like it was contemporaneous with 
the thine? 
M K . VALDEZ: Yes, it is. 
'THE COURT: Okay. Then for purposes of this trial, it 
s-isula^d that P-1, 2 and 3 may be recei ved under the i u'les 
. 1 case law, and they are received. 
You may proceed. 
MR. WEST i Thank yoi i, y oi n : Hone r 
Mi 1, VALDEZ: For the record, Judge, that is, of course, 
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case, and I have not read it, So, 
MR. WEST I " ] ] have a photocopy of that made so that 
the Court can have a clean copy of it. 
Counsel, I think, has addressed the very issue that is 
in issue her1 '"T1h^  oi ir^'s nos i f i in, < i course, is that the stop 
of the defendant was valid under the rationale of Terry vs. Ohio, 
because the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion 
t h a t c r i in i r 1 a 1 a c t i v i t \ v* a s a f o o t. 
And it's further based upon the law enunciated . in Adams 
-•. Williams, which is United States Supreme Court ca.n -• ^  , U.S. 
\nformani1 s r.it. , .arid thav's whan we hav- in "..is ca.-e -.:- the 
cases thai have been submitted to the Court and have been briefed 
*r-e cases which __ _ .'.LonaJ e 1 .c 13111 ci ases. Th s Effenbeck 
case, the only additional thing that I would say about that is that 
ne on- distinction between Effenbeck and the case before 
be Court .. : '- i n that , 1:1: le :i nit :>i: ma n t was g uaranteed h :i s 
,r.onymity and h<-re, aLchough not specific to this c a s e , the 
officer u'iv'-7 been a discatcher knew that the dispatchers 
u_: . ecuest. uhe name ar^: uaai-^. 
Also, i n Effenbeck, 2 2 mmut:e.t elapsed from the time 
- "
 :
 r.-atcher received the call until the defendant in that 
:s^ .. .s topped. In this case, tl le defei idai i t was st :>pped before j 
e 1-J:^ ~ho Stansbury Park area, and the Court being aware of that 
Qrea, -. L..-nk, cai i take judicial notice that there's probably 
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1 less than a mile from the Pro Shop to where you exit the Stansbury 
2 Park area. 
3 THE COURT: And where was he stopped? 
4 MR. WEST: At the gate on Highway 36. 
5 MR. v t ^ . A..*.. .- a J: . 
6 THE COURT: That's approximately a mile. 
7 MR. WEST: In Marvin vs. Stare, which I will supply a 
8 copy to the Court, is a case very similar to the case at bar. Ii i 
9 that case, the officer, carrying a C.B. radio was notified by a 
10 trucker that there was a car tail gating, and he stopped that car, 
11 well, actually the car stopped when he saw the officer, before 
12 any driving pattern was observed. And that case was a license 
13 si ispensj on case under a Minnesota ] aw v/hich is similar to the Utah 
14 law, and the defendant appealed the suspension of ;.L . icense 
15 using the same arguments, that there was no cause for Aie szop. 
1 6 ! T '•-.• c we"\ rer, found that there wa s *-" - the 
/: - :p based upon the fact that an anonymous tru^.,e: descri^e^ that 
IQ the car was tailgating and gave a description of the ca r. 
1 9 T .--- •" • . • : - ' se 
20 e x c e p t w h e r e t h e r e i ^ - - w a s an a d d i t i o n a l somewhat o r o i n / - n g 
21 p a t t e r n t h a t rhe o f f i c e r o b s e r v e d , t h e r e was some weav ing ; bu t i n 
22 t h e 0] se n •
 u., ^ , > •< L « a :i report b] • C B : : ad i < : f: : Dm, I 
23 b e l i e v e , a c o u p l e o f t r u c k e r s who o b s e r v e d a c a r w e a v i i l g , r e p o r t e d 
24 i t t o t h e t r o o p e r , a n d t h e t r o o p e r f o l l o w e d t h e c a r and f o u n d 
25 suiue s l i g h t w e a v i n g a n d p u l l e d t h e c a r o\ e r . 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
V. 
DAVID LOYOLA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 890436-CA 
Argument Priority 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from circuit courts pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(d). Appellant was convicted of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, 
a Class "B" Misdemeanor, on trial de novo before the Honorable Edward A. Watson, Judge, 
Third Circuit Court, in and for Tooele County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
May a peace officer lawfully make an investigatory stop based upon the report of an 
identified citizen informant that the driver of a particularly described vehicle is drunk? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (1) and (2) (1953 as amended): 
(l)(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person 
to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as 
shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control, or if the person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
1 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle* 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been 
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of 
violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-2 (1953 as amended): 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the 
presence of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the 
physical senses or any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, 
or range of any physical sense, or records the observations of any 
of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for 
believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission 
of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 31, 1988, Henry M. White, an employee at the Pro-Shop at the Stansbury 
Park Golf Course observed the Appellant consume several drinks. R. 112. Mr. White also 
noted that Appellant was visibly staggering. R. 112-13. Believing that Appellant was drunk, 
Mr. White attempted to persuade Appellant to find a ride home with someone, rather than 
drive. R. 113. However, Appellant ignored Mr. White's suggestion and got in his truck to 
leave. Mr. White then called the Tooele County Sheriff's Office, gave his name and address, 
reported that an intoxicated person was leaving the Pro-Shop, and described the truck that 
Appellant was driving. R. 113 
The Tooele County Dispatch Officer advised Trooper Allene Kerwood that a citizen 
had called from the Pro-Shop at Stansbury Park and had reported that an intoxicated person 
was driving a blue Mazda pickup truck with two barrels in back. R. 99. 
Having previously been assigned as a dispatch officer, Trooper Kerwood knew that 
citizens who call to report incidents are requested to provide their name and address. R. 98-
99. Trooper Kerwood saw a blue Mazda pickup with two barrels in the back just leaving the 
Stansbury Park area. She stopped the pickup and found Appellant behind the wheel. Motion 
to Suppress Transcript (hereafter M.T.) at 6-7. The distance from the Stansbury Park Pro-
Shop to the location where the stop was made is approximately one mile. M.T. at 17. 
Trooper Kerwood, noting an odor of alcohol about the Appellant as well as some 
difficulty with his speech, requested field sobriety tests. M.T. at 7. Based upon her 
observations and Appellant's performance of the field sobriety tests, Trooper Kerwood arrested 
Appellant and requested that he take an intoxilizer test. Appellant agreed and the test was 
3 
given by a certified officer and following proper procedure* MLT. at 8-9. The results 
indicated .14 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of Appellant's breath air, R. 104, 105. The 
intoxilizer machine had been checked both before and after August 31, 1988 (when Appellant 
was tested) and had been certified as operating correctly and providing correct readings. R. 
106-108. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A peace officer who has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot may legally make an investigatory stop. Such reasonable cause for a stop may be based 
upon information supplied by another person. While tips from an informant vary in 
trustworthiness, information from a citizen informant is presumed reliable. A citizen who 
identifies himself by name and address lends additional reliability to his statement. 
A peace officer is also entitled to rely upon a radio communication from another 
officer even though the officer sending the message does not advise the arresting officer of 
all indicia of reliability of the source of information. 
Laymen are capable of discerning when a person is too intoxicated to drive safely. 
Thus, the report of an identified citizen is sufficient basis for a peace officer to make an 
investigatory traffic stop. The intrusion of such a traffic stop is de minimus when balanced 
4 
against the need to apprehend the impaired driver before he strikes. Accordingly, evidence 
recovered as a result of such a stop is properly admitted at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TROOPER KERWOOD'S STOP OF APPELLANT WAS BASED UPON A 
REASONABLE, ARTICULATED SUSPICION THAT APPELLANT WAS DRIVING 
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
A. An Investigatory Stop May Be Based upon Less Than Probable Cause to Arrest. 
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States 
Supreme Court recognized that investigatory stops may be lawful even in the absence of 
probable cause to effect an. arrest. In Terry, a veteran police officer observed two men 
"casing" a store for an apparent robbery. The officer stopped and questioned the men and 
seized guns which were later admitted into evidence resulting in convictions for carrying 
concealed weapons. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, one of the men sought 
to have his conviction overturned, urging that the officer lacked probable cause to stop and 
question the men. The Court, however, found that when reviewing "necessarily swift action 
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat," the test is merely one 
of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. 392 U.S. 20, 88 S.Ct. 1879. The Court then 
held that the stop is lawful if the officer can "point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion/' 
392 U.S. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1880. The court observed that the conduct of the men as described 
by the officer, when taken in light of his experience, reasonably led him to conclude that 
5 
"criminal activity may be afoot." 392 U.S. 30, 20 L.Ed. 911. That was sufficient to warrant 
the stop and subsequent search. 
Cases applying Terry to automobile stops are legion. Only a few are noted here: 
Olson v. State. 698 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Wyo. 1985) ("A policeman is not required to simply 
shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur merely because he lacks the necessary 
information required for probable cause to arrest . . . . He may make an investigatory stop."); 
People v. Ingle. 330 N.E. 2d 39, 44 (N.Y. 1975) (A routine traffic stop requires only a 
minimal factual basis-enough to show that the stop is "not the product of mere whim, caprice, 
or idle curiosity."); Effenbeck v. State. 700 P.2d 811 (Alaska App. 1985) (An investigatory 
stop is appropriate where there are specific and articulable facts creating a reasonable 
suspicion that imminent public danger exists; an intoxicated driver is an imminent public 
danger.) 
The rule in Terry has essentially been codified by the Utah Legislature as follows: 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a public 
offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Ann., § 77-7-2. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15. 
Clearly, an intoxicated driver is committing a public offense. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44. Moreover, an intoxicated driver on a public highway is very likely to "injure 
another person or damage property belonging to another person." 
B. Reasonable Cause for a Stop May Be Based upon Information Received from 
Another Person. 
The facts constituting reasonable suspicion articulated by the officer in Terry were 
based upon his own observations. However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that 
information supplied by another person may also establish sufficient grounds for a stop. 
Adams v Williams. 407 U.S. 143, 32 L.Ed. 2d 612, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972). 
In Adams, an informant (known to the officer but unnamed in the record) told a police 
officer that Williams, who was seated in a nearby car, had a gun in his waistband and was 
in possession of heroin. The officer approached the car, tapped on the window, and asked 
Williams to open the door. Instead, Williams rolled down the window. The officer 
immediately seized the gun; then, incident to arrest for illegal possession of the gun, the 
officer conducted a search which revealed the heroin. 
On habeas corpus, the Supreme Court rejected Williams' argument that reasonable 
cause for a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal observation rather than 
on information supplied by another person. 407 U.S. 147, 32 L.Ed. 2d 617. 
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Adams was cited as authority in upholding the suspension of driving privileges in 
Marben v. State Department of Public Safety. 294 N.W. 2d 697 (Minn. 1980). The facts in 
Marben are very similar to those presented in the case at bar. In Marben, a police officer 
received a citizen band radio communication from an anonymous truck driver who described 
a vehicle as having been tailgating for 60 to 70 miles. The officer saw the car but did not 
observe improper driving. The car stopped and the officer asked the driver to walk toward 
the officer's car. The officer observed signs of intoxication and arrested the driver. The 
driver's license was later suspended for refusal to submit to a blood or breath test. When the 
driver challenged the stop, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trucker's 
communication provided the officer with a "specific and articulable suspicion of a violation." 
Thus the stop was upheld. 294 N.W. 2d 699. 
In the case at bar, Officer Kerwood had received a report that an intoxicated man was 
leaving Stansbury Park driving a Blue Mazda with two barrels in back. This information was 
ample to provide her with a "specific and articulable suspicion of a violation." 
C. The Citizen Informant's Tip Was Reliable and Provided Reasonable Cause to Make 
an Investigatory Stop. 
Unlike paid police informants whose livelihood may depend on regular reports of 
underworld activity, a citizen who volunteers information with no apparent improper motive 
in presumed reliable. 
In Effenbeck v. State. 700 P.2d 811 (Alaska App. 1985), the court distinguished citizen 
informants from police informants: 
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The former consist of ordinary citizens, including victims of crime, who aid the 
police because of concern for society or for their own safety. There is less 
need for establishing the credibility of such an informant. In contrast, 
the credibility and reliability of a police informant must be shown. . . . 
Informants from the criminal milieu are distrusted because they often 
give evidence against the defendant: (1) for pay; (2) for immunity from punishment; 
or (3) for personal advantage or vindication. Since the informant here is 
anonymous and his tip conveyed by phone through a police dispatcher, it is unlikely 
that he gave information in expectation of any one of these rewards. 
700 P. 2d 813-14 (citations omitted). See also Olson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 371 
N.W. 2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1985) ("A first-time citizen informer's credibility is generally 
presumed; such a person is 'one who is not involved in the criminal underworld and who has 
no track record as a police informant.'"). 
The facts in Effenbeck are nearly identical to those in the case before this court. In 
Effenbeck. a police dispatcher notified an officer that an anonymous caller had reported a 
drunk driver and provided a description of the car. About 22 minutes later, the officer located 
the car and made a stop without observing a driving pattern. In upholding the stop, the court 
made several observations which apply to the case at bar: 
L Because the informant in Effenbeck made the call from a gas station where the 
allegedly intoxicated driver bought gas, the statement was "anchored in time and place 
negating any risk that the information furnished was stale . . . ." 700 P.2d 813. The driver 
was apprehended only 22 minutes later. 700 P.2d 812. In the case at bar, Mr. White made 
the call from the Stansbury Park Pro-Shop from where the appellant had just departed. 
Furthermore, Appellant had traveled no more than a mile before being stopped at the entrance 
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to Stansbury Park. Mr. White's statement was firmly anchored in time and place. 
2. "The informant accurately described the vehicle and the police located it shortly 
thereafter." 700 P. 2d 813. Mr. White also accurately described Appellant's truck which 
was stopped within minutes. 
3. "While a statement that a driver was intoxicated is in part conclusory, it is the kind 
of shorthand statement of fact that lay witnesses have always been permitted to testify to in 
court." 700 P.2d 813. Mr. White also reported that Appellant was intoxicated. He saw 
Appellant consume several drinks, saw defendant staggering, and even tried to persuade the 
defendant to get a ride home. 
4. An intoxicated driver creates an "imminent public danger" capable of harm to 
persons or property. 700 P.2d 812. 
The case at bar presents an additional fact which enhances the informant's 
trustworthiness over that of the informant in Effenbeck. Here, Mr, White informed the 
dispatcher of his name and address. Thus, not only was he an unpaid citizen informant, he 
was also identified to the police. His self-identification effectively removes the likelihood that 
he was providing false information, for by so doing he would subject himself to prosecution. 
The fact that Mr. White identified himself also distinguishes this case from State v. 
Black. 721 P.2d 842 (Or. App. 1986), cited in Appellant's brief. 
D. Trooper Kerwood's Reliance on the Radio Report Was Lawful. 
As discussed above, the police dispatch officer received sufficient information from Mr. 
White to form reasonable cause to stop the Appellant. The record reveals that the substance 
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of this information was passed on to Trooper Kerwood via radio. While the dispatcher 
apparently did not advise Trooper Kerwood of the name of the informant, Kerwood was aware 
of the policy of dispatch to request that information. 
Notwithstanding Trooper Kerwood's actual knowledge of the details of the information 
at the time of the stop, she was entitled to rely objectively on the dispatched report. The 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that the validity of a stop rests on the facts in 
possession of the officer who issues an "all points bulletin" rather than on those in possession 
of the officer making the actual stop. 
In United States v. Hensley. 469 U.S. 221, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985), a police department 
in Ohio issued a wanted flyer for the defendant, Hensley. On the basis of the flyer, an 
officer from another department arrested the defendant. The defendant sought to suppress 
evidence seized incident to the arrest on grounds that the arresting officer had insufficient 
information to form probable cause for the arrest. 
The Supreme Court held that when police make an arrest and seize evidence on the 
basis of a wanted flyer or bulletin, the admissibility of seized evidence 
turns on whether the officers who issued the flyer possessed probable cause to 
make the arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the flyer were 
themselves aware of the specific facts which led their colleagues to seek their 
assistance. 
469 U.S. 231, 105 S. Ct. 681 (emphasis in original). The court noted that time 
is a critical element in police work and officers "cannot be expected to cross-examine their 
fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information." 469 U.S. 231, 105 
11 
S. Ct. 682. The court then concluded that 
if a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting 
a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then 
reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose 
questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to 
obtain further information. 
469 U.S. 232, 105 S. Ct. 682 (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
Hensley reasoning in State v. Bruce. 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (1989). Bruce upheld the 
admission of evidence secured as a result of a stop made on the basis of a police radio 
broadcast. The broadcast merely advised officers that an armed robbery had occurred and told 
them to "be on the lookout" for a described car and men. No details were broadcast which 
would have made the officers privy to facts establishing probable cause to make an arrest 
The court found that the police had sufficient facts to support an investigatory stop. Further, 
the officers who made the stop were entitled to objective reliance on the broadcast 
Accordingly, under Hensley the evidence was admissible. 114 Utah Adv. Rep. 8. 
Likewise, Trooper Kerwood was entitled to objective reliance on the radio report of an 
intoxicated driver. Because Mr. White's report to the dispatcher was sufficient to justify an 
investigatory stop, the evidence thus obtained was properly admitted into evidence. 
II. PUBLIC POLICY FAVORS ALLOWING A PEACE OFFICER WITH 
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY TO ACT PROMPTLY. 
This case presents the court with the opportunity to determine whether or not a peace 
officer who has received a report of an intoxicated driver may act promptly to protect the 
public. 
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The typical intoxicated driver is apprehended only because he or she is either involved 
in an accident or is observed by a peace officer to be driving erratically. Because the 
consumption of alcohol affects judgment and reaction time, an alcohol-impaired driver may 
often successfully negotiate the vehicle down a straight road without obvious outward 
indications of drunkenness. The impairment may only reveal itself when the driver must 
respond to a traffic condition such as a pedestrian or a curve or overtaking another vehicle. 
If an officer who has received a report of an intoxicated driver must wait to 
corroborate the report by observing a driving pattern, that driving pattern may first reveal itself 
as an accident. Given the minimal intrusion of a traffic stop, such a result is unnecessary. 
The citizen report of an intoxicated driver presents police with an exigent circumstance 
not present in many other types of criminal activity. For example, a report that someone is 
carrying illegal drugs or stolen property presents police with an illegal activity. While swift 
action may be necessary to apprehend a criminal or seize evidence of crime, a short delay is 
unlikely to endanger lives. The report of an intoxicated driver, however, presents a clear and 
present danger of imminent harm to persons and property. The failure of police to act 
immediately upon receipt of such information would be negligent. 
Accordingly, a rule strictly requiring police to more completely corroborate a citizen 
report of an intoxicated driver before making an investigatory stop would place law abiding 
motorists and pedestrians at risk of life and limb. Given the trustworthiness of a tip from an 
identified citizen, the inconvenience of a brief stop is de minimis when balanced against the 
State's interest in protecting the public from physical harm. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr, White's report that an intoxicated man driving a blue Mazda pickup with two 
barrels in the back had just left the Stansbury Park Pro-Shop provided police with a specific 
and articulable suspicion of a violation. Officer Kerwood's stop of the Appellant was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and evidence obtained pursuant to the stop was 
properly admitted at trial. Accordingly, the State requests that the conviction be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 1989. 
JOHN K. WEST 
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